Chicago Studies in Political Economy

Front Cover
George J. Stigler
University of Chicago Press, Oct 15, 1988 - Business & Economics - 641 pages
"There is no question that a well-defined 'Chicago School' of political economy has emerged, built largely around the work of George J. Stigler and his colleagues. Chicago Studies in Political Economy brings together the key works in this field, works that have been extremely influential among economists who study political processes. It is a collection of enormous value."—Roger G. Noll
 

Contents

Sam Peltzman
3
George J Stigler
106
An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional
116
A Theory of Primitive Society with Special Reference
151
The Theory of Economic Regulation
209
THE THEORY OF REGULATION
234
The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation
281
Sam Peltzman
303
Consequences and Causes of Public Ownership of Urban
404
Is the Doctor Sick or Are
426
Efficient Redistribution through Commodity
479
Whose SelfInterests Are Being
498
Law Enforcement Malfeasance and Compensation
593
The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth
612
Index
635
Copyright

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About the author (1988)

George Stigler was an American economist whose staunch support of the price system and competitive market forces made him one of the leading proponents of the "Chicago school" of economics. He was educated at the University of Washington, Northwestern University, and the University of Chicago. He taught at several universities, including Columbia University and the University of Chicago. Stigler's early interest was in the history of economic thought. His Essays in the History of Economics (1964), covering topics from utility theory to Fabian socialism, is a modern classic renowned for its clear, uncluttered style. His other classic work, The Theory of Price (1946), is a microeconomic text dealing with consumer behavior, prices, costs and production, monopoly, cartels, and the distribution of income. Stigler was well known for his interest in government regulation of public utilities and its impact on the consumer. His numerous studies led him to conclude that the regulator often becomes an advocate of, and spokesperson for, the industry, a development that tends to dilute the effectiveness of regulation. Regulation, in the long run, tends to weaken competition to the point where "it is of regulation that the consumer must beware." Stigler was awarded the Nobel Prize for his work on government regulation and the structure of industry.